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Newsgathering Takes Flight in Choppy
Skies: Legal Obstacles Affecting
Journalistic Drone Use
Clay Calvert,* Charles D. Tobin,† & Matthew D. Bunker‡
This Article examines legal challenges confronting journalists who
use drones to gather images. Initially, it traces the history of drones and
the Federal Aviation Administration’s efforts to regulate them, as well
as new state legislation that aims to restrict drones. This Article then
illustrates that a wide array of legal remedies already exist for individuals harmed by journalistic drone usage, and it argues that calls for additional, piecemeal state laws to regulate drones are unnecessary and unduly hinder First Amendment interests in newsgathering and the public’s right to know. Furthermore, this Article asserts that the reasonableexpectation-of-privacy jurisprudence developed in aerial Fourth
Amendment cases should be brought to bear in drone intrusion cases.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 1, 2014, journalist Pedro Rivera used his own
drone to record images from a traffic accident in Hartford, Connecticut.1 He flew it about 150 feet above a marked crime scene
area while standing on public land.2 In a subsequent federal lawsuit,
1

Susan Campbell, Hartford Drone Case Journalist Still Grounded, HARTFORD
COURANT, Apr. 26, 2015, at C3.
2
Id.; see Patrik Jonsson, Groundbreaking Drone Coverage of Tornado Damage Piques Ire
of FAA, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON. (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2014/
0430/Groundbreaking-drone-coverage-of-tornado-damage-piques-ire-of-FAA-video
[http://perma.cc/GBP8-7CZD] (“Connecticut photographer Pedro Rivera flew a drone
over a fatal traffic accident on Feb. 1, and he now alleges in a federal lawsuit that two
Hartford, Conn., police officers demanded that his employer punish him for doing so.”).
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Rivera alleged that police ordered him to stop the drone and leave
the scene, and that the officers later complained to his employer
that he had interfered with a police investigation.3
In March 2015, however, U.S. District Court Judge Vanessa
Bryant held in Rivera v. Foley4 that Pedro Rivera failed to state a
claim against the police for forcing him to bring down the drone.
Specifically, she concluded the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity5 against that aspect of Rivera’s First Amendment6 claim
because there was no clearly established right in that jurisdiction—
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—to record police
activity.7 The court further found that even if there were such a
clearly established right to record police conduct, it applies only to
handheld recording devices wielded by journalists on terra firma.8
Rivera, on the other hand, “directed a flying object into a policerestricted area, where it proceeded to hover over the site of a major
motor vehicle accident and the responding officers within it, effectively trespassing onto an active crime scene.”9
Rivera may well be the first reported decision involving the legal rights of broadcast reporters flying drones, but it certainly
won’t be the last. And despite the discouraging result for news or3

Rivera v. Foley, No. 3:14-cv-00196 (VLB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639, at *4–5 (D.
Conn. Mar. 23, 2015).
4
Id.
5
See id. at *26; see generally Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (finding that
“[a] government official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of
the challenged conduct”) (emphasis added); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232
(2009) (observing that “[q]ualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct
violated a clearly established constitutional right”).
6
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part,
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety
years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as fundamental
liberties to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
7
Rivera, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639, at *25–26.
8
See id. at *24–25 (noting that “in cases where the right to record police activity has
been recognized by our sister circuits, it appears that the protected conduct has typically
involved using a handheld device to photograph or videotape at a certain distance from, and
without interfering with, the police activity at issue”) (emphasis added).
9
Id. at *25.
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ganizations, it seems unlikely that future courts will be quite as
dismissive of drone use by reporters as the Rivera court.
Drones (technically referred to as “unmanned aircraft systems,” or “UAS”)10 are on the cusp of becoming major drivers of
technological and economic change. Initially known for their role in
warfare and antiterrorism,11 drones carry the potential to generate
innovation in numerous domains beyond newsgathering, including
law enforcement, utility maintenance, scientific research, and business.12 Many people became aware of the economic promise of
drones when Amazon chief executive officer Jeff Bezos appeared
on 60 Minutes to demonstrate their potential for rapid order delivery.13
For news operations, drones have enormous advantages. Not
only are drones often vastly less expensive for the media to operate
than manned aircraft, but, as one Congressional Research Service
report put it: “they can operate in dangerous areas without putting
a human operator at risk of danger; can carry sophisticated surveillance technology; can fly in areas not currently accessible to traditional aircraft; and can stay in flight for long durations.”14 Already,
despite Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) limitations,

10

ALISA M. DOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RES. SERV., INTEGRATION OF
DRONES INTO DOMESTIC AIRSPACE: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1 n.1 (2013),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42940.pdf [http://perma.cc/76ME-KEHK].
11
See generally Doyle McManus, Are We Winning the Drone War?, PITT. P OSTGAZETTE, May 1, 2015, at A-8 (noting that “the drone wars began” eight years ago in
2008, and arguing that the Obama administration needs “a top-to-bottom review of its
drone policies—focused not only on targeting rules, but also on costs and benefits”);
Scott Shane, Ghosts in the Cross Hairs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2015, at A1 (describing the
use of drones by the United States under President Barack Obama to target terrorists, and
noting that the “drone’s vaunted capability for pinpoint killing appealed to a president
intrigued by a new technology and determined to try to keep the United States out of new
quagmires”).
12
See infra Part I (describing the history of drone use).
13
See Doug Gross, Amazon’s Drone Delivery: How Would it Work?, CNN (Dec. 2,
2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/02/tech/innovation/amazon-drones-questions/
[http://perma.cc/PWZ4-6WWX]; Alexis C. Madrigal, A Drone Scholar Answers the Big
Questions About Amazon’s Plans, ATLANTIC (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2013/12/a-drone-scholar-answers-the-big-questions-about-amazonsplans/282009/ [http://perma.cc/NZZ8-B8K7].
14
DOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 17.
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dramatic video footage has demonstrated the power of drone journalism.15
The current legal landscape of drone journalism, however, is
chaotically confused. Although the FAA asserts that commercialmedia use of drones must be expressly authorized by the FAA,16
there are some signs the agency may yet relax that regulatory
stance,17 including a recent agreement by the FAA with news organizations to test drones in partnership with Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University (“Virginia Tech”).18 An added layer
of complexity arises from state statutory regulation of drone use,
with forty-five states considering more than 160 bills in 2015
alone.19
This Article clarifies the most important legal issues surrounding media use of drones today. It also argues that existing legal
principles governing newsgathering and privacy are sufficient to
resolve concerns about media drone use. Scant legal literature on
15

See, e.g., Fire Rips Through Brooklyn Recycling Plant: Drone Captures Flames on Video,
NBC N.Y. (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/BrooklynWarehouse-Fire-Greenpoint-250886721.html [http://perma.cc/RJ9K-UVSE].
16
See Memorandum from Mark W. Bury, Assistant Chief Counsel for Regulations,
Fed. Aviation Admin., to James H. Williams, Manager, Unmanned Aircraft Integration
Office, Fed. Aviation Admin. (May 5, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/
headquarters_offices/agc/pol_adjudication/agc200/interpretations/data/interps/2015/
williams-afs-80%20-%20(2015)%20legal%20interpretation.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4H9PGVMY].
17
See Al Tompkins, What the FAA’s Newly Proposed Drone Rules Mean to Journalists,
POYNTER (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.poynter.org/news/mediawire/320079/what-thefaas-newly-proposed-drone-rules-mean-to-journalists [http://perma.cc/FD2Z-TSNK];
Mark Waite, New Rules Governing Drone Journalism Are on the Way—and There’s Reason
to Be Optimistic, NIEMAN LAB (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.niemanlab.org/2015/02/newrules-governing-drone-journalism-are-on-the-way-and-theres-reason-to-be-optimistic
[http://perma.cc/ZC8F-Z6LJ].
18
Ravi Somaiya, Times and Other News Organizations to Test Use of Drones, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/16/business/media/10companies-join-effort-to-test-drones-for-newsgathering.html
[http://perma.cc/HJ4VRSTS]. The FAA also has granted an exemption to CNN for drone flights for
photography, with severe restrictions on who may operate the drones and under what
conditions. David Goldman, CNN Cleared to Test Drones for Reporting, CNN (Jan. 12,
2015),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/12/technology/cnn-drone/
[http://perma
.cc/A4PY-RDBD].
19
Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmannedaircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx [http://perma.cc/UG5P-9XP5].
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drones and newsgathering now exists,20 and the authors of this Article believe it provides significant original analysis of tort-based
drone issues that advances scholarship on this important topic.
Part I provides an account of the legal background of media
drone use, including the current status of FAA regulation and state
statutory law. Part II explores three key newsgathering challenges
that almost certainly will arise as drone use for newsgathering proliferates. Those challenges are: (1) legal limits on photographing police activities; (2) restrictions imposed by the tort of intrusion into
seclusion; and (3) limits created through trespass law, antipaparazzi statutes, and similar legal doctrines. Finally, this Article
concludes by arguing that existing doctrines, tailored to fit specific
news-drone uses, already provide sufficient mechanisms to balance
the public and media’s First Amendment newsgathering interests
with individual interests in property, privacy, and safety.
I.

EVOLVING GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF
DRONE OPERATIONS
This Part has four sections. Initially, Section A provides a brief
history of drones and aerial photography, while Section B then
traces FAA efforts to regulate drone usage. Next, Section C analyzes the FAA’s case against a drone enthusiast named Raphael
“Trappy” Pirker. Finally, Section D explores current efforts to regulate drones.
A. History of Drones and Photography
Unmanned aircraft systems—“UAS” in government jargon or
“drones” in common parlance—have existed in one form or
20

See, e.g., Donna A. Dulo, Drones and the Media: First and Fourth Amendment Issues in
Technological Framework, 5 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 217 (2014); Benjamin D. Mathews,
Potential Tort Liability for Personal Use of Drone Aircraft, 46 ST. MARY’S L.J. 573 (2015);
Mickey H. Osterreicher, Charting the Course for Use of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems in
Newsgathering, 2014 PEPP. L. REV. 101 (2014); Nabiha Syed & Michael Berry, JournoDrones: A Flight over the Legal Landscape, 30-JUN COMM. LAW. 1 (2014). There is also
growing literature on Fourth Amendment issues in drone use, a topic this Article does not
address. See, e.g., Taly Matiteyahu, Drone Regulations and Fourth Amendment Rights: The
Interaction of State Drone Statutes and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 48 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 265 (2015).
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another since pre-Civil War days, mostly as vehicles of warfare.
The Habsburg Austrian Empire used ordnance-laden balloons to
quell the Venetian uprising in 1849.21 Airplane co-inventor Orville
Wright and business partner Charles Kettering developed the
“Kettering Bug,” denominated the world’s first “self-flying aerial
torpedo,” during World War I in a secret U.S. government laboratory.22 The Cold War brought jet-powered drones,23 and with the
1960 downing over the Soviet Union of a U-2 spy plane and the
capture of U.S. serviceman Gary Powers, the American military
stepped up development of drones to lower risk to human pilots.24
The Obama Administration has increased its use of drones from
that of its predecessors’ to target terrorists in the Middle East and
Africa.25
Paralleling the rise in military development, recreational drone
operators have enjoyed flights of radio-controlled aircraft for several generations. The community of hobbyists who spent their spare
time building and flying radio-controlled aircraft came together in
1936 to form the Academy of Model Aeronautics (“AMA”).26 The
AMA began developing community-based safety and flight training
programs and other standards for recreationalists.27 The organization currently boasts more than 175,000 members.28

21

Brian Holman, The First Air Bomb: Venice, 15 July 1849, AIRMINDED BLOG (Aug. 22,
2009),
http://airminded.org/2009/08/22/the-first-air-bomb-venice-15-july-1849/
[http://perma.cc/UR27-439K].
22
Jimmy Stamp, World War I: 100 Years Later, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/unmanned-drones-have-been-aroundsince-world-war-i-16055939/?no-ist [http://perma.cc/2N3E-N33G].
23
JOHN DAVID BLOM, CSI OCCASIONAL PAPER 37, UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 51 (2010), http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/
csipubs/OP37.pdf [http://perma.cc/7T89-6AX4].
24
See id. at 56.
25
See Jack Serie, Almost 2,500 Now Killed by Covert U.S. Drone Strikes Since Obama
Inauguration Six Years Ago: The Bureau’s Report for January 2015, BUREAU
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/
2015/02/02/almost-2500-killed-covert-us-drone-strikes-obama-inauguration/
[http://perma.cc/UY8Y-G3VM].
26
ACAD. MODEL AERONAUTICS, http://www.modelaircraft.org/ [http://perma
.cc/JAF4-4QUL] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).
27
Id.
28
Id.
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Progress in mobile technology for photography has tracked that
of government and civilian drone technology. In 1858, French photographer Gaspar Felix Tournachon used a tethered balloon to capture the first known aerial photographs, over the village of PetitBecetre Paris.29 In 1906, George R. Lawrence deployed a system of
seventeen kites to lift heavy camera equipment for panoramic photography of the devastation wrought by the San Francisco earthquake and fire.30
But it was the Eastman Kodak Company’s 1888 introduction of
the Brownie camera—the first mass-produced, easily portable
model—that launched more than a century of debate over privacy
and the press. As the Brownie quickly became popular, many decried the rise of “camera fiends” who brought their Brownies to all
manner of public gatherings.31 Municipal beaches, and even the
Washington Monument, began to ban their use.32 And the advent
of the Brownie, in part, led Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis two
years later to worry that “modern devices afford abundant opportunities for the perpetration” of invasive wrongs, and to wonder
“whether the existing law affords a principle which can properly be
invoked to protect the privacy of the individual.”33 Today, nearly
every court ruling on privacy and the press finds its origins in Warren and Brandeis’ seminal article,34 which was largely prompted as
a fearful backlash to the emerging hobbyists’ and professional photographers’ communities.

29

History of Aerial Photography, PROF. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHERS ASS’N,
http://professionalaerialphotographers.com/content.aspx?page_id=22&club_id=808138
&module_id=158950 [http://perma.cc/PK8U-EPYK] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).
30
Id.
31
See David Lindsay, The Kodak Camera Starts a Craze, PUB. BROAD. SERV.,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/eastman/peopleevents/pande13.html
[http://perma.cc/B2SM-36M4] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).
32
See id.
33
Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
34
For a few recent examples that demonstrate the continuing impact of the Warren
and Brandeis article on modern privacy law, see Peckham v. New England Newspapers,
Inc., 865 F. Supp. 2d 127, 129–30 (D. Mass. 2012); Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v.
HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1137 n.13 (W.D. Wash. 2011); Curran
v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:07-0354, 2008 WL 472433, at *3 (W.D. W. Va. Feb. 19,
2008).
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B. The Federal Government Regulates Model Aircraft Hobbyists
The public and news media remain understandably confused
as to the state of regulation when it comes to the right to fly
drones. Indeed, for years the government gave little guidance,
likely because it did not want to impede recreational use of radio-controlled hobby aircraft. Imagine the embarrassing headlines that might result from the government slapping a twelveyear-old with a hefty fine for flying his or her birthday present
too close to people in the local park.
For this reason, until recent years, the FAA—the subagency within the U.S. Department of Transportation charged
with policing safety in the national airspace—took a fairly gentle
approach. In 1981, for example, the FAA released a set of guidelines, developed in cooperation with the AMA, that made clear
no FAA approval was required to fly a hobby drone if the operator observed certain parameters.35 These included a flight ceiling of 400 feet above the ground and holding off on flights near
spectators until the drone had been tested and proven airworthy.36 The guidelines did not discuss any business use for
drones.
Then, in 2007, recognizing that drone use was “a quickly
growing and important industry,” the FAA issued a policy advisory.37 The policy advisory stated that the FAA’s previous
guidance on drone operations “only applies to modelers, and
thus specifically excludes its use by persons or companies for
business purposes.”38 Businesses using drones, according the
this pronouncement, labored under the “mistaken understand35

FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 91-57, MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATING
STANDARDS (1981), http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/
91-57.pdf [http://perma.cc/J82P-LNNQ]. In recently tightening-up drone regulation, the
FAA rescinded these guidelines on September 2, 2015 and supplanted them with a new
set of “Model Aircraft Operating Standards.” FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY
CIRCULAR 91-57A, MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATION STANDARDS (2015), http://www.faa
.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_91-57A.pdf
[http://perma.cc/DH63-ELLY] [hereinafter ADVISORY CIRCULAR 91-57A].
36
See ADVISORY CIRCULAR 91-57A, supra note 35.
37
Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689
(Feb. 13, 2007).
38
Id. at 6690.
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ing that they are legally operating.”39 The advisory failed to
provide a definition of “business purposes” or any guidance for
civilian use of drones by most businesses.
No path to the lawful commercial use of drones would
emerge for another five years, when, at the urging of the Obama
Administration, Congress passed the FAA Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012.40 The Act mandated the FAA to “provide
for the safe integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into
the national airspace system as soon as practicable, but not later
than September 30, 2015.”41 Congress, not wanting to force the
industry to be entirely grounded for three more years, included
an all-important provision into the Act. Section 333 required the
Secretary of Transportation to “determine if certain unmanned
aircraft systems may operate safely in the national airspace system before completion” of final plans to integrate commercial
drones.42
Since the Act, and through the end of 2015, the FAA has
granted more than three thousand section 333 exemptions for
commercial drone operations, ranging from pipeline inspections
to closed-set filmmaking.43 The exemptions contain stringent
limitations, such as restricting the person operating the drones’
controls to licensed pilots who have received an FAA medical
certificate, bans on nighttime flights, and bans on flights over
crowds of people.44

39

Id.
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (Feb.
14, 2012).
41
Id. § 332(a)(3).
42
Id. § 333.
43
Authorizations Granted Via Section 333 Exemptions, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section_333/333_authorizations/
[http://perma.cc/5E5H-J4CA] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).
44
See Section 333 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section_333/333_faqs/
[http://perma.cc/3QMT-NMPA] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).
40
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C. The Pirker Case: The FAA Wins Challenge by Commercial
Drone Photographer
The incident that awakened the news media to the drone
regulatory environment was a legal challenge brought by freelance photographer Raphael “Trappy” Pirker.45 A cult hero of
sorts to model pilots and photographers, Pirker in 2011 flew a
camera-equipped, fixed-wing, styrofoam-constructed Ritewing
Zephyr drone around the grounds of the University of Virginia,
on an assignment from an advertising company.46 Pirker’s
breathtaking video, posted on YouTube,47 caught the attention
of the FAA, which issued a $10,000 civil penalty alleging that
he conducted a “careless or reckless operation of an unmanned
aircraft” in violation of FAA safety regulations.48
Pirker, relying on the murky state of the FAA’s regulatory
scheme, initially won dismissal of the fine in an administrative
hearing on grounds that what he flew was a model, not an “aircraft” under federal regulations, and that the government had
no authority to regulate model flights.49 On November 18, 2014,
however, the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”),
which acts as the appellate body for FAA administrative rulings,
sided with the government. It broadly held that the FAA possessed authority to regulate any “aircraft”—model or commercial.50 Pirker settled with the FAA shortly after the ruling.51
45

See Julianne Chiaet, Drone Pilot Challenges FAA on Commercial Flying Ban, SCI. AM.
(Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/drone-pilot-challenges-faacommercial-flying-ban/ [http://perma.cc/ANZ5-KJFQ].
46
Id.
47
sUAS News, Stunt Sheep Don’t Try This at Home: Trappys $10k Fine UVA Video,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 15, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OZnJeuAja-4
[http://perma.cc/3C9K-NCB3].
48
Opinion and Order at 1–2, Huerta v. Pirker, No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. 2014),
http://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/Documents/5730.pdf [http://perma.cc/9HXS-ZUYN].
Specifically, the FAA charged Pirker with violating 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a), which prohibits
operation of “an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or
property of another.” Id. at 2 n.2.
49
Id. at 2.
50
See id. at 4–7.
51
Jack Nicas, U.S. Federal Aviation Administration Settles with Videographer over
Drones, WALL S T. J. (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-federal-aviationadministration-settles-with-videographer-over-drones-1421960972
[http://perma.cc/T4AC-VDWG].
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Pirker’s case, as it involved photographers’ rights, galvanized the media community. Briefs supporting his cause were
filed by a number of photography and news media interests, including a coalition of twenty-two cable and broadcast networks
and ownership groups.52 These briefs argued that the news media’s and public’s First Amendment interest in newsgathering
required the government to take special care only to enact narrowly tailored restrictions that accomplish compelling safety
goals.53 Unfortunately, in its ruling in the government’s favor,
the NTSB sidestepped that issue entirely.
Nonetheless, the ruling led to the continued collaboration
among the news media to press the government for narrow restrictions that will preserve maximum opportunities to gather
news with drones. Many news companies that participated in
the coalition, for example, have joined a program under an FAA
license to Virginia Tech to test drones under real-life news scenarios.54
D. Current Developments in Drone Regulation
1. Federal Regulatory Efforts & Media Organizations’
Input
The FAA in February 2015, as Congress had required, released a proposed regulation for commercial drone use, including a weight limit on the aircraft of fifty-five pounds.55 The proposed regulation contains many of the same restrictions as the
section 333 exemptions: licensed pilots, no nighttime flights,
and very limited ability to fly in populated areas.56
52

Brief of News Media as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Pirker, No. CP-217,
https://app.ntsb.gov/legal/pirker/AmicusBriefNewsMedia.pdf
[http://perma.cc/YME6-JQC3] [hereinafter News Media Brief].
53
See generally id.
54
See Brian Stelter, Major Media Companies Unite to Test ‘News Drones,’ CNNMONEY
(June 16, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/16/media/media-coalition-newsdrones/ [http://perma.cc/4D8D-LPB8].
55
Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg.
9544 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015).
56
See Overview of Small UAS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/media/021515_sUAS_Summary.
pdf [http://perma.cc/J59T-WLGV] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).
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The proposal also contains, however, a suggestion that the
FAA may enact a separate rule for “micro” drones weighing
4.4 pounds or less, which would include most of the less expensive models that newsrooms seek to use.57 While the ban on
nighttime flights and other restrictions would apply, the FAA’s
proposed rule contemplates that a proficiency test, but no pilot’s license or medical certification, would be required—a far
more practical and helpful criterion for most broadcasters.58
The FAA is not expected to enact this final rule until 2017.59
More than 4,500 people and organizations filed comments to
the proposed rule.60 The same news media coalition that supported Pirker’s battle with the FAA filed comments that were
largely supportive of the proposed regulation, but encouraged
further regulatory relaxation to maximize opportunities to use
drones in daily newsgathering.61
On the same day as the FAA released the proposed rule,
President Obama issued an executive memorandum requiring
the National Telecommunications Infrastructure Agency
(“NTIA”), a component of the Department of Commerce, to
convene a “multi-stakeholder engagement process to develop
and communicate best practices for privacy, accountability, and
transparency issues regarding commercial and private UAS
use.”62 The NTIA is currently holding open meetings with var57

Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. at
9556–58.
58
See id.
59
Brian Fung, The FAA Won’t Make Up Its Mind on Drone Rules Until 2017—at the
Earliest, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2014/12/10/the-faa-wont-make-up-its-mind-on-drone-rules-until-2017-atthe-earliest/ [http://perma.cc/3W3K-7EB8].
60
Docket Folder Summary—Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=FAA-20150150 [http://perma.cc/CY9U-D93S] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).
61
See News Media Coalition, Comment Letter on Operation and Certification of Small
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.medialaw.org/images/
medialawdaily/05.04.15faacomment.pdf [http://perma.cc/8ED2-49RX].
62
Presidential Memorandum: Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding
Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems,
WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 15, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/
15/presidential-memorandum-promoting-economic-competitiveness-while-safegua
[http://perma.cc/FP82-CEYZ].
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ious industries interested in the use of drone technology.63 The
news media is participating in the meetings, and has filed written comments urging that the federal government look to existing state law and not enact any new federal drone regulations for
civilian use.64
In one significant regulatory development, the news media
secured a crucial concession from the FAA’s lawyers. In 2013,
an FAA spokesperson had warned a Dayton, Ohio journalist
against posting hobbyist-filmed drone video of a fire, which had
been offered to the newspaper; the newspaper had no involvement in the flight, but cautiously called the FAA to ask about
the legality of using the video.65 First Amendment law would
strongly counsel that, absent any involvement by journalists in
unlawfully flying a drone, receiving footage would constitute
“lawfully obtaining” the material, and a constitutional right to
publish the footage, if newsworthy, would attach.66 The news
media complained that the FAA’s arbitrary warning to the Dayton newspaper was unconstitutional.67
At the urging of the news media, the FAA in May 2015 published a legal opinion sharply drawing the distinction between
the unlawful operation of a drone itself and the lawful publication of newsworthy, drone-captured images.68 The opinion
made clear that, if a news outlet does not operate or control the
drone, the FAA cannot punish it for accepting drone images:
63

See Multistakeholder Process: Unmanned Aircraft Systems, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO.
ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2015/multi
stakeholder-process-unmanned-aircraft-systems [http://perma.cc/Q8Y2-FJGH].
64
See Letter from Charles D. Tobin, Attorney for Cox Media Grp., LLC, to Nat’l
Telecomm. & Info. Admin. (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
cox_media_group_llc_04_20_2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/3G45-GQZX].
65
See Tristan Navera, Why You Won’t See Drone Footage from Downtown Fire on Our
Site, DAYTON BUS. J. (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.bizjournals.com/dayton/blog/2014/
04/why-you-won-t-see-drone-footage-from-downtown-fire.html
[http://perma.cc/X3AM-X9A7].
66
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court held that a journalist who received a
recording of an illegally taped telephone conversation, with no involvement in or notice of
the illegal taping, had “lawfully obtained” the recording. 532 U.S. 514, 514–15 (2001).
The Court further held that, as the tape contained newsworthy information, the First
Amendment precluded punishment when the journalist broadcast it on the radio. Id.
67
See News Media Brief, supra note 52, at 9–10.
68
Memorandum from Mark W. Bury to James H. Williams, supra note 16.
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“A media entity that does not have operational control of the
UAS and is otherwise not involved in its operation falls outside
of the FAA’s oversight.”69 The opinion even authorizes payment after-the-fact: “Whether the media entity pays for or obtains the pictures, videos, or other information for free would
not affect this analysis.”70
The opinion makes crystal clear, however, that in the FAA’s
view, freelancers or employees of media companies must obtain
FAA clearance to fly newsgathering drone missions: “A person
who wishes to operate a UAS to take pictures or videos or gather other information that then would be sold to media outlets
would need an FAA authorization for the operation.”71
2. State and Local Governments Create Stormy Skies for
Drone Journalism
As the federal government tries to bring predictability to
drone regulation, a number of states72—and even some municipalities73—have enacted drone regulations of their own. Some of
these laws pose few problems for journalists. Maine’s law, for
example, is aimed solely at law enforcement, providing detailed
requirements for issuance of warrants for drone surveillance, a
ban on police use of biometric technology, and a right for citi-

69

Id. at 2.
Id.
71
Id.
72
A collection of the current state drone laws is found at the National Conference of
State Legislatures’ website. See Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, supra
note 19.
73
In March 2015, the city council of Berkeley, California enacted a one-year
moratorium on police use of drones, even though its police chief said acquiring a drone is
“not on our radar.” Emilie Raguso, Council: No Drones for Berkeley Police for 1 Year,
BERKELEYSIDE (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.berkeleyside.com/2015/03/02/council-nodrones-for-berkeley-police-for-1-year/ [http://perma.cc/P4PM-VPMA]. The AugustaRichmond County (Georgia) Commission, in the run-up to the 2015 Masters
Tournament at the Augusta National Golf Club, enacted an ordinance banning all drone
flights during April 2–13, 2015. See Alex Miceli, PGA Tour: Drones Banned over Augusta
During Masters, GOLFWEEK (Mar. 20, 2015), http://golfweek.com/news/2015/mar/20/
masters-2015-augusta-national-drones-banned/ [http://perma.cc/H34D-KFYY].
70
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zens to sue an police agency for violations.74 Michigan’s drone
laws simply prohibit using drones to interfere with hunting.75
Other states’ laws, however, are fraught with significant
First Amendment problems that will cloud the skies for broadcasters who want to use drones. Florida’s new statute, for example, provides a private right of action against a drone operator who, “with the intent to conduct surveillance,” captures
images of private property—even unoccupied property—”in
violation of such person’s reasonable expectation of privacy
without his or her written consent.”76 That leaves a lot of reporters covering hurricane damage, an unfortunately common
occurrence in Florida, to wonder whether drone news photography exposes them to significant legal risk.77
Texas has perhaps the most hostile statute for drone journalism, with the potential jailing of broadcasters for violations.
Texas’ drone statute makes it a misdemeanor for any person to
use “an unmanned aircraft to capture an image of an individual
or privately owned real property in this state with the intent to
conduct surveillance on the individual or property captured in
the image.”78 The statute goes even further, providing for misdemeanor punishment, not only for the unlawful operation of a
drone, but additionally for the “disclosure, display, distribution,
or other use of an image” captured during a prohibited drone
flight.79 Texas also permits the “owner or tenant of privately
owned” property to sue the drone operator for civil damages for
capturing “an image of the property or the owner or tenant.”80
North Carolina, by contrast, sensibly included an exception in

74

ME. STAT. tit. 25, § 4501 (2015).
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.40111c(2) (2016) (prohibiting hunting via drone); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 324.40112(2)(c) (2015) (prohibiting interfering with hunting via drone).
76
FLA. STAT. § 934.50(3)(b) (2015).
77
Jensen Werley, Florida’s New Drone Laws Could Create Big Problems for One Major
Industry, JACKSONVILLE BUS. J. (May 18, 2015), http://www.bizjournals.com/
jacksonville/news/2015/05/18/floridas-new-drone-laws-could-create-big-problems.html
[http://perma.cc/QV28-RBDP].
78
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.003(a) (West 2015).
79
Id. § 423.003(b).
80
Id. § 423.006(a).
75
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its drone law for “news gathering, newsworthy events, or places
to which the general public is invited.”81
II.

NAVIGATING NEWSGATHERING CHALLENGES
AND OBSTACLES: THE COMPLEX LANDSCAPE
CONFRONTING DRONE USAGE
This Part explores the potential liabilities facing broadcast
journalists who hope to use drones to gather news. Specifically,
Section A returns to the Rivera case noted in the Introduction and
examines in greater detail the contested terrain of the nascent,
qualified First Amendment right to record police performing duties
in public places. Section B then explores potential civil liability for
drone usage under the tort theory of intrusion into seclusion. Finally, Section C delves into a range of extant statutes and commonlaw theories, stretching from anti-paparazzi statutes to the traditional torts of trespass and infliction of emotional distress, courts
may come to apply when confronted with cases involving drone
journalism. Ultimately, this Part demonstrates that the law already
furnishes multiple legal limitations on drone use by journalists, as
well as numerous potential remedies for aggrieved plaintiffs. Adding even more new statutory liability, as some states have been eager to do, thus amounts to legislative overkill and chills First
Amendment freedoms.
A. Using Drones to Film Police Performing Duties in Public Places:
The Unsettled State of the Law and a Troubling Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court has not squarely addressed whether
the First Amendment provides the right to capture images of law
enforcement personnel carrying out their duties in public venues.82
Establishing this right, however, would seem to flow logically
from several well-established principles.

81

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-300.1(b)(2) (2015).
See Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 3 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1057 (D.N.M. 2014)
(“Neither the Tenth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has directly addressed a right—
constitutional or otherwise—to record police or law enforcement activity in public.”
(emphasis added)).
82
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Specifically, the Supreme Court recognizes that images, not
merely spoken and written words,83 are protected by the First
Amendment.84 Additionally, courts are clear that people—in
this case, police officers—do not possess reasonable expectations of privacy when they are situated in public places, such as
streets and sidewalks where much police work occurs.85 Furthermore, the conduct of police, as government officials, is a matter of public concern, and speech regarding matters of public concern is, as the Supreme Court reiterated in 2011, at the heart of the
First Amendment.86
Despite this trio of indubitable propositions, and in the absence of any guidance from the nation’s high court, U.S. District Judge Vanessa Bryant of Connecticut found a split of authority in March 2015 among the federal appellate circuits when
it comes to the right to record police.87 She observed in Rivera
v. Foley—the drone journalism-based case addressed above in
the Introduction—that “[t]he First Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Eleventh Circuit, and Ninth Circuit all recognize that the First
Amendment protects the photography and recording of police officers engaged in their official duties . . . . The Third Circuit and
the Fourth Circuit take the contrary approach.”88
Most recently, the First Circuit, with its 2014 ruling in Gericke v. Begin,89 squarely recognized a First Amendment right to
83

Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)
(observing that “the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of
expression”).
84
See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1973); see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (concluding that “expression by means of motion
pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments”).
85
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (reasoning that “[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection”); Jackson v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13
(S.D. Ohio 1983) (finding no expectation of privacy in a tort case where the plaintiffs
“were on a city sidewalk in plain view of the public eye”).
86
See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011).
87
Rivera v. Foley, No. 3:14-cv-00196 (VLB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639, at *24 (D.
Conn. Mar. 23, 2015).
88
Id. Judge Bryant noted that, outside of the Second Circuit, “[o]ther circuits are split
on this issue.” Id.
89
See Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014).
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film government officials, including police officers, performing
their duties in public places.90 The court observed that First
Amendment principles regarding gathering information about government officials “apply equally to the filming of a traffic stop and
the filming of an arrest in a public park.”91 It emphasized that “[a]
traffic stop, no matter the additional circumstances, is inescapably
a police duty carried out in public. Hence, a traffic stop does not
extinguish an individual’s right to film.”92
The federal circuits recognizing a First Amendment right to
record police, however, all have made it clear that this right is qualified, not absolute, and must be balanced against the reasonable
needs of law enforcement. For instance, the First Circuit in Gericke
wrote that “[r]easonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to
film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them.”93 It
added that “a police order that is specifically directed at the First
Amendment right to film police performing their duties in public
may be constitutionally imposed only if the officer can reasonably
conclude that the filming itself is interfering, or is about to interfere,
with his duties.”94 A vast problem for broadcast journalists, regardless of whether they use drones or other technologies, is the nebulousness of this reasonableness standard, especially when courts
are likely to grant vast deference to police when evaluating if a restriction on the right to record is reasonable.
The drone-based decision of Rivera v. Foley95—the only case of
its kind as of late 2015—occurred at the district court level within
the Second Circuit, which has yet to directly address the right-torecord-police issue. Rivera, however, suggests that some judges are
reticent to recognize a First Amendment right to record police using drones, especially when they fly above where police are working.96
90

See id. at 7–10.
Id. at 7.
92
See id.
93
Id. (emphasis added).
94
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
95
No. 3:14-cv-00196 (VLB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2015).
96
See id. at *24. Moreover, the FAA is enlisting the assistance of local law enforcement
to spot civil infractions of federal drone-safety regulations. See Law Enforcement Guidance
for Suspected Unauthorized UAS Operations, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
91
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As noted in the Introduction, Pedro Rivera used a drone during
daylight hours to record a vehicular accident scene.97 Importantly,
he stood outside of the crime-scene area and flew the drone about
150 feet directly above it.98 Were the images important, powerful,
and newsworthy? As succinctly noted in the Columbia Journalism
Review, Rivera’s images “gave an unsettling panorama of the crash
scene, including the car’s wrinkled steel frame compressed into a
brick wall as police worked the scene. Rivera’s tape had a vivid,
eyewitness feel that far surpassed the quality of shots from cameramen behind yellow police tape.”99
Rather than embracing this enhanced public perspective into
the issue of highway safety and police responsiveness, when Judge
Bryant watched the video she saw only an alleged incursion into a
controlled crime scene. She was reluctant to acknowledge a First
Amendment right to record based on these facts, instead reasoning
that Pedro Rivera:
[D]irected a flying object into a police-restricted
area, where it proceeded to hover over the site of a
major motor vehicle accident and the responding officers within it, effectively trespassing onto an active
crime scene . . . . Even if recording police activity
were a clearly established right in the Second Circuit, Plaintiff’s conduct is beyond the scope of that
right as it has been articulated by other circuits.100
She added that in those cases “where the right to record police
activity has been recognized by our sister circuits, it appears that
the protected conduct has typically involved using a handheld device to photograph or videotape at a certain distance from, and
without interfering with, the police activity at issue.”101 In brief,
http://www.faa.gov/uas/regulations_policies/media/FAA_UAS-PO_LEA_
Guidance.pdf [http://perma.cc/C583-NPPU] (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). This may
encourage police agencies to more vigorously restrict drone journalism than their police
powers ordinarily would permit.
97
Rivera, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639, at *3.
98
See id.
99
Louise Roug, Eye in the Sky, COLUM . JOURNALISM REV. (May 1, 2014),
http://www.cjr.org/cover_story/eye_in_the_sky.php [http://perma.cc/2QGU-73D8].
100
Rivera, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639, at *26 (emphasis added).
101
Id. at *24–25.
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Judge Bryant found that cases involving handheld devices were distinguishable from drones and, in turn, she held a drone flying about
fifty yards—half of a football field—above a crime scene constitutes an aerial trespass.
Perhaps most troubling here is the deference Judge Bryant gave
police in restricting drone use. She opined that Pedro Rivera’s
“operation of an unusual and likely unidentified device into a cordoned-off area at the scene of a major motor vehicle accident and
ongoing police investigation provides arguable reasonable suspicion
that Plaintiff was interfering with police activity.”102
Additionally, Jude Bryant created a problematic dichotomy between vertical and horizontal distances. As Professor Eugene Volokh asserted:
[I]t’s not clear to me why video recording a scene
from 150 feet above is any more of an intrusion into
a police investigation than video recording it from
150 feet away horizontally or diagonally (if the drone
had been off to the side but looking down at angle),
at least unless a police helicopter was nearby or was
likely to be nearby.103
Indeed, it is the same knotty horizontal-versus-vertical dichotomy that Matthew Shroyer, president of the Professional Society of
Drone Journalists, echoed regarding Rivera. He noted: “Other
photographers who arrived documented the scene with telephoto
lenses, which were much more intrusive than Rivera’s drone. Yet
those journalists were never questioned, let alone expelled from the
scene, pursued, and suspended.”104
102

Id. at *20 (emphasis added). Query whether the operation of drones today (Rivera
used his in 2014) is really so “unusual” that an officer can reasonably deem a drone’s
mere presence—some 150 feet above a crime scene—sufficient to constitute, in and of
itself, an interference with police activity. As drone use by broadcast journalists
proliferates, surely this line of logic must eventually fail.
103
Eugene Volokh, No Drone Surveillance of Crime Scene (Even From 150 Feet Above),
Police Say, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Mar. 30, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/30/no-dronesurveillance-of-crime-scene-even-from-150-feet-above-police-say
[http://perma.cc/8AF9-3R9X].
104
Matthew Shroyer et al., Statement in Support of Pedro Rivera from the Professional
Society of Drone Journalists, PROF. SOC’Y DRONE JOURNALISTS (Feb. 24, 2014),
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In fact—and clearly militating in favor of Pedro Rivera—the
FAA investigated the incident and concluded “there was no evidence of careless or reckless operation or commercial operation of
the drone in question.”105 All of this calls into question the outcome in Rivera. An image captured by Pedro Rivera remains online
today, and the authors recommend that readers review it to see the
clarity and benefit provided by the use of drone journalism in this
case.106
B. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
Of the four privacy torts, intrusion is the claim a plaintiff’s lawyer most likely would deploy to attack a journalist’s allegedly injurious use of a camera-equipped drone. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ majority formulation, intrusion requires
an intentional intrusion, “physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs . . . if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”107 In determining if a defendant intrudes on a plaintiff’s “solitude or seclusion,”
the tort mandates that a plaintiff possess a “reasonable expectation
of privacy.”108 This typically limits the tort to places such as the
inside of a plaintiff’s home, a clothing fitting room, and analogous
venues—a “private hotel room, ship cabin, house trailer, and hospital room”109—where a plaintiff possesses an expectation of seclusion.
Intrusion, however, is not coextensive with trespass law (addressed below in Section C). That’s because some trespasses are
not tortious for intrusion purposes, while numerous successful inhttp://www.dronejournalism.org/news/2014/2/statement-in-support-of-pedro-riverafrom-the-professional-society-of-drone-journalists [http://perma.cc/LBA9-GMPN].
105
FAA Releases Report on Hartford Drone Incident, FOX 61 (Jan. 7, 2015, 2:54 PM),
http://foxct.com/2015/01/07/faa-releases-report-on-hartford-drone-incident
[http://perma.cc/QX69-EBMC] (emphasis added).
106
To view the image, see Matthew Schroyer, FAA Investigation Finds Connecticut
Journalist Was Flying Safely and Legally, PROF. SOC’Y DRONE JOURNALISTS (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://www.dronejournalism.org/news/2015/1/faa-investigation-finds-connect
icut-drone-journalist-was-flying-safely-and-legally [http://perma.cc/H6BX-86U9].
107
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
108
Rodney A. Smolla, Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law, 27 NOVA.
L. REV. 289, 314 (2002).
109
DAVID A. ELDER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY 37 (1991).
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trusion claims do not involve physical trespasses.110 As noted
above, the intrusion can be physical “or otherwise,” with the
“otherwise” sweeping up electronic surveillance technologies—
high-powered cameras, for example—and, importantly now,
drones.
As mentioned, a reasonable expectation of privacy frequently
arises when the plaintiff has a justifiable sense she is in a private
zone of interest. As one commentator put it: “Incorporating implicitly or explicitly the standard used by the Supreme Court in
Fourth Amendment111 cases, the courts have emphasized that the
common law was and is ‘intended to protect people, not places.’”112 Thus, in a drone-based scenario, technical questions of curtilage and the like are certainly not dispositive of an intrusion claim.
The fact that most jurisdictions require the intrusion to be intentional diminishes the tort’s impact in some newsgathering situations. For example, as one commentator observes, “[i]f a newsgathering drone is covering an apartment fire, and, while it does so,
the operator pans the camera lens or yaws the drone so as to capture a momentary image through a bedroom window, the intentionality element is not met.”113 Nonetheless, where newsgathering
drones are purposefully used to gather images from a private location—imagine, for instance, a drone hovering over a walled-in
110

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment has been incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state and local government
entities and officials. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding, with regard to
the exclusionary rule adopted in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1924), that “all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that
same authority, inadmissible in a state court”); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949)
(“[W]e have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police
incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourth Amendment.”).
112
ELDER, supra note 109, at 41 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967)).
113
Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law Abiding Drones, 16 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 385, 442 (2015).
111
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backyard otherwise not visible to surrounding neighbors or from
the street or sidewalk—the act may be tortious.
There are, as yet, no reported intrusion-by-drone decisions. Indeed, there are almost no cases dealing with tortious intrusion by
any aerial technology. One of the very few is Streisand v. Adelman,114 an unreported California trial court decision in which singer
Barbra Streisand sued a photographer who took aerial photos of her
Malibu home as part of an ecological history initiative. The photographer shot from a helicopter flying off the coast—rather than directly over Streisand’s property—at altitudes of 150 to 2,000
feet.115 Streisand advanced a variety of privacy theories, including
intrusion.
The California court, ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion116 by the
photographer, held that Streisand had no reasonable expectation of
privacy, in part because “occasional overflights are among those
ordinary incidents of community life of which plaintiff is a part.”117
The court also reasoned that aerial photography along the picturesque Pacific coast was a “routine activity.”118 It further noted
that although Streisand’s property was not visible from the street,
she had “taken no steps to preclude persons passing by in airplanes
from seeing into her backyard.”119
The defendant’s own actions also played a key role in the “no
reasonable expectation” finding. That’s because the defendant did
not hover over Streisand’s yard to take pictures of her or of some
social gathering at her house. Nor did operating the helicopter
create a nuisance—facts the court implied might have changed the
114

Statement of Decision, Streisand v. Adelman, No. SC 077 257 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec.
31, 2003), http://www.californiacoastline.org/streisand/slapp-ruling.pdf [http://perma
.cc/6S4K-BWDQ].
115
See id. at 4.
116
California’s anti-SLAPP law protects individuals from a “Strategic Lawsuit Against
Public Participation” (“SLAPP”) and allows them to file a motion to dismiss complaints
that were intended to censor or silence free speech. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16
(West 2015); Calif. Case Law Is an Excellent Anti-SLAPP Resource, LAW360 (Feb. 28,
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analysis. As it reasoned, “any intrusion on these facts is de minimis.”120
The court also analogized to Fourth Amendment cases holding
that aerial overflight and photography by the government do not
violate a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. For example,
the Streisand court cited California v. Ciraolo,121 a U.S. Supreme
Court decision finding that a warrantless law enforcement plane
overflight and photography of the defendant’s backyard at an altitude of 1,000 feet was constitutional, even though the yard was
surrounded by a ten-foot high fence. Despite that fence, which
made it impossible for ground-level passersby to peer into the yard,
the high court reasoned: “In an age where private and commercial
flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of
1,000 feet.”122
Moreover, the Streisand court held that the singer could not
prove the “highly offensive to a reasonable person” element of intrusion. In particular, the court noted that the defendant “was engaged in his avocation of photographing the California coastline for
an ecological history project and did not take [the photo] with any
other purpose in mind.”123 It is not entirely clear that the defendant’s purpose is ordinarily determinative as to the “highly offensive” element,124 but there is precedent suggesting that it is an important factor. The California Supreme Court in Shulman v. Group
W Productions, Inc.125 observed that “all the circumstances of an
intrusion, including the motives or justification of the intruder, are
120

Id. at 37.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
122
Id. at 215.
123
Statement of Decision, supra note 114, at 35.
124
The Restatement of Torts discussion suggests that the “highly offensive” element
derives more from the actual conduct of the defendant rather than the ultimate purpose of
the intrusion. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
One noted treatise opines that the determination of what is highly offensive in a
newsgathering context turns on “the location of the subject, the nature of any invitation
to approach the subject, the presence or absence of electronic devices, and the intensity of
the approach.” BRUCE SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 11.2 (1991).
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Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
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pertinent to the offensiveness element.”126 Thus, a journalist using
a drone might assert that a First Amendment motive in informing
the public with images captured of a newsworthy event makes the
action, per se, not offensive.127 Indeed, in other news tort contexts,
courts have taken a “news” motive into account to find that the
journalist’s conduct was lawful.128
Although Streisand generally seems well reasoned under traditional intrusion principles, importantly, it is an unreported trial
court decision with no precedential importance. Still, it likely
represents—at least in a big picture sense—the sort of contextual,
fact-intensive reasoning other courts might employ in intrusion-bydrone scenarios.
Another aerial intrusion case held that flying model airplanes
near—and sometimes directly over—the plaintiffs’ property did
not support a claim of intrusion. In Kaiser v. Western R/C Flyers,
Inc.,129 the defendants operated a nonprofit organization that promoted radio-controlled model airplanes. They rented a field near
126

Id. at 493.
Indeed, the California high court wrote in Shulman that “the constitutional
protection of the press does reflect the strong societal interest in effective and complete
reporting of events, an interest that may—as a matter of tort law—justify an intrusion
that would otherwise be considered offensive.” Id. Yet this noble-motive factor in
offensiveness is anything but airtight. The Shulman court stressed that “[e]quipment
such as hidden cameras and miniature cordless and directional microphones are powerful
investigative tools for newsgathering, but may also be used in ways that severely threaten
personal privacy. California tort law provides no bright line on this question; each case
must be taken on its facts.” Id. at 494 (emphasis added). More than fifteen years after that
language from Shulman, drones now constitute “powerful investigative tools for
newsgathering,” and the journalists who operate them must be mindful of the case-bycase nature of the offensiveness inquiry.
128
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Times Pub. Co., 780 So. 2d 310, 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (dismissing claims of tortious interference against media defendant where
“public interest in the free flow of information,” the “routine newsgathering techniques
used by the reporter,” and the information obtained that was of public concern militated
against a finding that reporter had improper motives in newsgathering); Dulgarian v.
Stone, 652 N.E.2d 603, 609 (Mass. 1995) (granting summary judgment in favor of media
defendants on tortious interference claims where there was no indication that the
allegedly defamatory conversation was “carried on for any purpose other than
journalism”); see also Dukas v. D.H. Sawyer & Assocs., Ltd., 520 N.Y.S.2d 306, 309
(Sup. Ct. 1987) (rejecting tortious interference claims where “[i]t is clear that if any
interference occurred it was merely incidental to defendants’ exercise of their
constitutional rights”).
129
Kaiser v. Western R/C Flyers, Inc., 477 N.W.2d 557 (1991).
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the plaintiffs’ property and regularly flew the planes—which made
what the plaintiffs described as an irritating sound—in the vicinity
of the plaintiffs, including some instances in which the planes actually flew over the plaintiffs’ property or crash landed on it.130
The Nebraska Supreme Court, applying that state’s statutory
intrusion doctrine, cited examples from the Restatement that included a reporter entering a hospital room to take photographs and
persons engaging in wiretapping and window peeking.131 The court
reasoned from these examples that the Nebraska intrusion statute
was not “designed to protect persons from the type of intrusion
involved in this case.”132 Although not stating so explicitly, the
high court seemed to suggest that the model plane flying was de
minimis compared to the paradigm intrusion cases discussed by the
Restatement’s authors. Moreover, the court held that the model
plane activities did not “rise to the level of being ‘highly offensive
to a reasonable person.’”133 The opinion provided little explanation, however, for this conclusion, although a reasonable assumption is that any offensiveness was relatively minor.
Kaiser is somewhat analogous to a drone case because modern
drones, especially the smaller models many news media outlets
contemplate using, are often roughly the same size as model airplanes. Unfortunately, the case does not provide an estimate of the
altitude at which the model planes flew. Unlike the facts that might
generate a potential media drone intrusion case, of course, the
planes were not being intentionally flown over the plaintiffs’ property and there was no allegation of still or video photography taking
place. As suggested by the Streisand court, Fourth Amendment
doctrine features established case law analyzing what precisely
constitutes a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”134 Importantly,
this might further guide doctrinal development in the intrusion-bydrone context.
130

Id. at 559.
See id. at 562.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
The Court’s reasonable expectation jurisprudence requires a two-part inquiry that
asks whether the defendant has “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and
whether that expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Yet, there is no complete agreement as to whether the Fourth
Amendment “reasonable expectation” standard is identical to or
coextensive with the “reasonable expectation” rubric used in intrusion doctrine. In his leading privacy treatise, J. Thomas McCarthy suggests the two are the same,135 while the California Supreme
Court has opined that, at least in an employment context, because
of “special considerations involved in defining the private citizen’s
protection against intrusion by the government and the government’s unique interest in investigating and suppressing criminal
activity, decisions discussing employees’ expectations of privacy
against government searches are not directly applicable to the common law privacy tort context.”136
Regardless of the outcome of this technical conundrum, which
is beyond the scope of this work to resolve, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence on the “reasonable expectation of privacy” already
has provided useful and persuasive analogies to courts looking for
guidance in intrusion cases. This is particularly true given the paucity of tort cases involving aerial intrusion that might be applied to
drone scenarios; Fourth Amendment law is much more robust in
this area.
In Fourth Amendment case law, courts have reached differing
conclusions regarding a criminal defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy based on factors such as the altitude of the aerial
observer, the legality of the aircraft’s position in public airspace,
the speed of the aircraft, the use of special surveillance equipment,
and the intensity of the surveillance.137 The U.S. Supreme Court
has decided three aerial surveillance cases, including Ciraolo, discussed earlier, in which the defendant was found to have no reasonable expectation of privacy in his fenced backyard when police
photographed it from a plane at 1,000 feet. There was no reasonable expectation despite the fact that the Court considered the backyard to be within the “curtilage” area of the defendant’s home.138
135

J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 657–59 (2d ed.
2015).
136
Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 978 P.2d 67, 74 n.3 (Cal. 1999) (emphasis added).
137
See Annotation, Aerial Observation or Surveillance as Violative of Fourth
Amendment Guaranty Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 56 A.L.R. Fed. 772
(1982) (listing relevant cases).
138
See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
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Curtilage is the legal term for surrounding land and buildings closely associated with a house that also merit some level of privacy protection.139
The Court, in a sharply divided decision, also found no reasonable expectation of privacy in Florida v. Riley in 1989.140 Riley involved warrantless police surveillance of a greenhouse behind the
defendant’s mobile home in a remote area. Police circled twice
over the property in a helicopter at an altitude of 400 feet and observed marijuana plants (there was no still or video photography).141 The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion by Justice Byron
White, reasoned that, while the defendant had taken precautions to
prevent surveillance from ground level, the sides and roof of the
greenhouse were allowed to remain open.142 Nor was the Court
moved by the fact that the helicopter was flying at an altitude of
400 feet—that altitude, unlike the 1,000-foot limit for fixed-wing
aircraft, was a lawful one for a helicopter and, more relevant now
than ever, is the FAA-mandated ceiling for drone flights.143 The
Court observed that “there is nothing in the record or before us to
suggest that helicopters flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare in
this country to lend substance to respondent’s claim that he reasonably anticipated that his greenhouse would not be subject to observation from that altitude.”144 The quoted statement suggests
that the fact that a technology is common can tend to diminish the
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy; to the extent that
drones become commonplace, that very fact may well alter the average person’s reasonable expectation.
The final case in this Supreme Court aerial trio is Dow Chemical
Co. v. United States.145 It arose when the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency hired an aerial photographer to take warrantless
pictures from altitudes of 12,000, 3,000, and 1,200 feet above a
139

See id. at 212–13.
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
141
See id. at 448.
142
Id. at 450.
143
The 400-foot ceiling for drone operations is contained in all authorizations granted
by the FAA pursuant to section 333. See Authorizations Granted Via Section 333
Exemptions, supra note 43.
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Riley, 488 U.S. at 451.
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Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
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Dow plant inaccessible from the ground and that the agency was
investigating.146 Part of Dow’s plant was indoors, but some of its
machinery and operations were outside and not covered in a way
that precluded aerial surveillance, despite the presence of a nearby
airport and frequent overflights by planes. The Supreme Court majority concluded that Dow had no reasonable expectation of privacy
because:
[T]he open areas of an industrial plant complex with
numerous structures spread over an area of 2,000
acres are not analogous to the “curtilage” of a dwelling for purposes of aerial surveillance, such an industrial complex is more comparable to an open
field and as such it is open to the view and observation of persons in aircraft lawfully in the public airspace immediately above or sufficiently near the
area for the reach of cameras.147
Among state and lower federal courts, there are dozens, if not
hundreds, of cases exploring the reasonableness of a Fourth
Amendment expectation of privacy under various fact patterns.
Consider, for example, State v. Bryant,148 a 2008 decision by the
Vermont Supreme Court, in which police used a helicopter to surveil the defendant’s marijuana crop near his home. The state high
court found that there was indeed a reasonable expectation of privacy by the defendant because witnesses described the helicopter’s
observation as “so long and so low and so loud.”149 The court
found the flight (apparently made without cameras) to be “fifteen
to thirty minutes of hovering over defendant’s property at altitudes
of as low as 100 feet.”150
These decisions, collectively, make clear that a rich body of law
already exists that will help guide a principled approach to drone
intrusion cases. Far from being an indeterminate question, Fourth
Amendment law can provide resources—with necessary doctrinal

146
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148
149
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See id. at 229–30.
Id. at 239.
State v. Bryant, 950 A.2d 467 (Vt. 2008).
Id. at 481.
Id. at 475.
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tweaks for tort purposes—to make sense of and provide predictability for the intrusion-by-drone context.
One of the strong facets of intrusion as applied to drone-based
newsgathering is that it carries the potential to strike the right balance from a First Amendment perspective. “Reasonable expectation” is an administrable standard that provides sufficient certainty, while maintaining some flexibility, to provide the media with
sensible guidance and notice regarding what conduct might be actionable. Furthermore, it does not overprotect privacy interests as
some drone-specific legislation might—the “highly offensive to a
reasonable person” element, while somewhat ambiguous, provides
enough of a thumb placed down squarely on the First Amendment
scale to safeguard a great deal of newsgathering conduct that is not
strikingly unorthodox or outrageous. As the next Section reveals,
however, intrusion is not the only legal theory of which broadcast
journalists who deploy drones must be aware.
C. Other Existing Legal Restrictions Facing Broadcast Drone
Journalists
In addition to the intrusion tort addressed above, several other
legal landmines lurk for broadcast journalists who deploy drones.
This Section provides a brief overview of them, with a primary focus on the common-law theory of aerial trespass.
1. Trespass
To prevail on a claim for trespass, a plaintiff typically must
prove the defendant made an intentional, unauthorized entry onto
property owned or controlled by the plaintiff.151 The notion of an
aerial trespass has early roots in a seventy year-old U.S. Supreme
Court decision, in which the Court remarked that “if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.”152
Thus, the danger for drone journalists is that trespass principles
may apply to aerial entries immediately above a person’s property.

151
152

See Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677 (Ct. App. 1986).
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (emphasis added).
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The 2002 case of Bevers v. Gaylord Broadcasting Co., L.P.,153 although involving a helicopter rather than a drone, is illustrative in
this area.
Bevers pivoted on the use of a television news helicopter flying
over the residence of Gail Bevers to gather images for “a story
about the poor condition of rental properties.”154 The Texas appellate court hearing the case reasoned that “one of the key facts in
ascertaining whether a flight through airspace constitutes a trespass
is the altitude of the aircraft.”155 Turning to the Restatement for
additional guidance, the court found that an aerial trespass exists
only if: (1) there is a “substantial interference”156 with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the property; and (2) the aircraft travels
within the “immediate reaches” of the land. On the case’s facts,
the court held that “a single ten-minute hover over [Bevers’] property at 300 to 400 feet does not, as a matter of law, rise to the level
of ‘substantial interference’ with the use and enjoyment of the underlying land.”157 After ruling against Bevers, the court declined to
address “whether a flight at 300–400 feet was within the ‘immediate reaches’ of the airspace.”158
Broadcast journalists who use drones face the yet-unknown applications of aerial trespass law. Unfortunately, the law in this area
remains unsettled and provides little guidance to journalists. Professor Troy Rule, writing in a 2015 law journal article, aptly dubs it
“the murky realm of aerial trespass because the upper boundaries of
landowners’ airspace rights are largely undefined.”159 He explains
that:
In aerial trespass cases, courts must engage in subjective and unpredictable inquiries into whether the
alleged aerial intrusion penetrated the amorphous
“immediate reaches” of the plaintiff’s airspace and
153

Bevers v. Gaylord Broad. Co., L.P., 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5083 (App. July 18,
2002).
154
Id. at *2.
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Id. at *8.
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Id. at *16.
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Id. at *17 n.3.
159
Troy A. Rule, Airspace in the Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 170 (2015)
(emphasis added).
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whether such intrusion substantially interfered with
the plaintiff’s “use” of her land. And in the case of
alleged trespasses involving drones, a court could
even elect to apply an altogether different rule based
on a finding that a drone was more like a projectile
than an aircraft.160
Ultimately, the bottom line is that broadcast journalists today
lack clear guidance about the rules regarding aerial trespass by
drones. A very brief flight over property at 300 to 400 feet, however, could be safe if other courts adopt the logic of Texas appellate
court in Bevers, absent a drone-specific statute to the contrary.
That seems particularly true because a small-size drone appears
less likely to substantially interfere with a landowner’s use and enjoyment of property than a much larger news helicopter like that
used in Bevers.
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Over the years, broadcast journalists’ conduct has also been
challenged under the legal theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).161 The IIED tort requires a plaintiff to
prove four elements: (1) the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) the defendant’s intent when engaging in that
conduct was to cause the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress or
the defendant acted with reckless disregard of causing such distress; (3) the defendant’s conduct was, in fact, the actual cause of
the plaintiff’s emotional distress; and (4) the plaintiff’s emotional
distress was severe, rather than minor or fleeting.162

160

Id.; see City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 750, 758 (D.N.J. 1958)
(noting that to prevail for aerial trespass, a plaintiff must prove “an unlawful invasion of
the immediate reaches of his land; in other words, there must be evidence that the aircraft
flights were at such altitudes as to interfere substantially with the landowner’s possession
and use of the airspace above the surface”).
161
See, e.g., KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431 (Ct. App. 1995);
Armstrong v. H & C Commc’ns, Inc., 575 So. 2d 280 (Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The IIED
tort is sometimes called the “tort of outrage,” as it is in Florida. See Armstrong, 575 So. 2d
281.
162
Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Cause
of Action Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 476 (2000).
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Although the authors could locate not locate an IIED drone
case on point, a plaintiff’s lawyer may argue that a news drone, hovering for a sustained and prolonged period of time at a very low
altitude above a person’s private home, could constitute extreme
and outrageous behavior. For example, a paparazzo might use a
low-hovering drone to record video of a celebrity swimming and
sunbathing in her backyard. Or a drone journalist chasing a breaking-news story may capture aerial images of a hostage-taker’s arrest
inside a walled compound. In either case, if the backyard was surrounded by a high enough wall giving rise to an otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy, it then is conceivable that the owner of
either property would have viable causes of action for: (1) intrusion
(discussed in Section B above); (2) trespass; and (3) IIED. In fact,
this trio of torts has been successfully bundled together against
broadcast journalists in a single lawsuit, albeit in a context predating drone usage.163
3. Other Theories of Potential Liability for Drone Journalism
Other legal challenges for broadcast journalists gathering news
via drones include the possible use of anti-paparazzi statutes. For
example, California has on the books an anti-paparazzi law for a socalled “constructive invasion of privacy” that sweeps up drone use
over private residences where people have a reasonable expectation
of privacy.164 Specifically, that statute holds civilly liable for treble
damages a defendant who:
[A]ttempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive
to a reasonable person, any type of visual image,
sound recording, or other physical impression of the
plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, or familial
activity, through the use of any device, regardless of
whether there is a physical trespass, if this image,
sound recording, or other physical impression could
not have been achieved without a trespass unless
the device was used.165
163

See Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1986) (involving liability
for intrusion, trespass, and IIED stemming from a media ride-along scenario).
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See id.
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In light of this language, media defense attorneys Nabiha Syed
and Michael Berry stress that “in California, drone operators need
to understand that particular state’s anti-paparazzi law.”166
Significantly, in October 2015, California Governor Jerry
Brown signed into law Assembly Bill 856, which adds the words
“airspace above the land of another” to California’s anti-paparazzi
statute in order to prohibit “the use of drones to cross over fences,
bypass gates and travel into private sanctuaries in order to peer into
windows, capture goings on and otherwise spy on the private lives
of public persons.”167 As the Los Angeles Times reported, the new
law “expand[s] privacy protections to prevent paparazzi from flying drones over private property.”168 In fact, some California-based
celebrities have claimed that drones spied on them, including singer Miley Cyrus who reportedly “caught sight of a drone over her
home [in 2014] . . . . She took video of the unmanned aircraft and
posted it online.”169
Some might wonder whether video voyeurism statutes apply
when journalists use low-flying drones to capture images above a
person’s house or even to peer into windows. The answer, generally speaking, is no. That’s because the typical video voyeurism statute only applies if the defendant recorded images for a sexual pur-
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pose, arousal, or amusement, not when the purpose is to gather
newsworthy information.170
In summary, this Part illustrated that multiple theories of liability already exist for broadcast journalists who use drones to cover
news. These doctrines are in addition to the new state laws and
pending legislation specifically targeting drones addressed earlier in
Part I.
CONCLUSION
The law of newsgathering via drones is clearly in flux. The
FAA’s highly restrictive stance at present is a major concern, but
the authors believe that in the coming years news organizations will
be given much freer rein to use the public airspace for their work.
Once that occurs, the legal system will need to achieve some reasonable balance between the First Amendment protected work of
news organizations and the privacy and property rights of citizens.
It is also imperative that the law be sufficiently well-defined and
determinate to allow broadcast journalists to go about their important work with a reasonable degree of certainty regarding what
conduct may trigger legal consequences.
As the preceding Parts made clear, a considerable body of existing tort law already protects people who believe they are victims of
unlawful journalism. Extant legal templates—particularly, perhaps,
the reasonable expectation jurisprudence developed in aerial
Fourth Amendment law that can be brought to bear in intrusion
doctrine—can guide the process of explicating rights between media outlets and citizens in a way that is sensitive both to nuance in
individual cases and to the compelling imperatives of the First
Amendment. The authors hope that state legislatures, driven by
fears of a new and unfamiliar technology, will avoid a rush to enact
untested and possibly extreme legislative solutions to problems that
already are susceptible to resolution under existing tort doctrine.
The hasty enactment of drone-specific legislation may be wellintentioned, but it may also be hard to undo when the dust settles.
Moreover, as one astute commentator put it, “rushing to enact
170
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new laws could threaten to extinguish the nascent drone industry
before it gets off the ground and before we fully understand drones’
potential uses and benefits.”171 That point is particularly salient
when the “uses and benefits” involve a constitutionally protected
activity such as newsgathering.
California Governor Jerry Brown recently followed similar logic
when he vetoed a bill that would have severely limited drone use in
the California.172 In September 2015, Brown vetoed Senate Bill 142,
which would have made anyone flying a drone at an altitude lower
than 350 feet over private property liable for damages for “wrongfully occupy[ing] property.”173 Brown stated that the proposed law
“could expose the occasional hobbyist and the FAA-approved
commercial user alike to burdensome litigation.”174 Indeed, the
National Press Photographers Association, along with California
newspapers such as the Los Angeles Times and Sacramento Bee, sent
a letter to Governor Brown asserting that the regulations in Senate
Bill 142 would be “impossible to comply with” and “impossible to
enforce.”175
Ultimately, drones will be used for gathering news. Some of
those uses will be of high public significance, some less so. The authors believe the existing array of remedies—along with a healthy
respect for First Amendment values—can provide the resources to
resolve the inevitable disputes that will arise.
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